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DEMORE V. KIM: IS THE SUPREME COURT
DECREASING THE RIGHTS OF LAWFUL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 29, 2003, the Supreme Court decided Demore v. Kim,
1
holding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may
detain deportable criminal aliens without bail hearings during their
2deportation proceedings. The Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, determined that the provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act 3 that allows for the detention of an alien without bail
pending deportation proceedings does not violate the alien's due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment.4 In doing so, the
Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the lower courts.5 This
decision reverses a long history of recognizing the rights asserted by
aliens as deserving of protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
This Case Comment will begin by discussing the facts and
procedural history of Demore. It will then analyze the Supreme
Court's decision and reasoning. Next, this Comment will briefly
describe how courts in the past have upheld the due process rights of
aliens and have recognized that due process for these aliens includes
many of the rights enjoyed by citizens. Additionally, the courts
historically have explained that lawful permanent residents
("LPRs"), as a sub-class of aliens, should enjoy even greater
protection than the larger class of aliens in general. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that the Supreme Court's flawed reasoning
in Demore resulted in a violation of the fundamental right of freedom
from needless detention that should belong to aliens as well as to
1. 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003).
2. Id. at 1712.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000).
4. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1708.
5. Id. at 1713.
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citizens. This Case Comment further expresses concern that, with
this case, the Supreme Court may be embarking on a new trend:
paying lip service to an alien's right to due process while in practice
diminishing the constitutional rights of aliens residing in the United
States by defining due process-as applied to them-unjustifiably
narrowly.
II. CASE BACKGROUND
In 1984, Hyung Joon Kim, a Korean citizen, entered the United
States at the age of six.6 He became an LPR two years later.7 In July
1996, when he was eighteen, Kim was convicted of first-degree
burglary.8 A year later, he was convicted of "petty theft with priors"
and sentenced to three years in prison.9 Immediately after his release
from prison, the INS 10 detained Kim without bail under the authority
of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B)." The INS claimed that under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(43), Kim's second conviction "qualified as an 'aggravated
felony,"' and therefore, he could be deported under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).1
2
After being held in INS custody for over three months without
the opportunity for a bail hearing, Kim filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.' 3  Kim argued that the no-bail provision of
6. See Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d. 523, 526 (9th Cir. 2002).
7. Id. There are many ways for an alien to become an LPR, including
sponsorship through a family member who is either a citizen or an LPR, or
sponsorship through employment. See United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Immigration Classification and Visa Categories, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/immvisas.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
The case does not mention how Kim became an LPR.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The INS was restructured under the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) on March 1, 2003, and is -now called the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). See United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, This is USCIS, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/
thisisimm/index.htm (last modified Nov. 19, 2003). This Comment will
continue to use "INS" instead of "USCIS" because all of the cases discussed
herein refer to the agency as the INS.
11. Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 526.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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§ 1226(c) 14 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Specifically, Kim maintained that the Due Process
Clause requires that before detaining aliens pending their
proceedings, these detainees are constitutionally due at least the
process of an individualized determination of risk that they would
fail to report or would commit further crime if not detained pending
their proceedings.' 5 The district court agreed and held that § 1226(c)
was "unconstitutional on its face" as applied to the broad class of
aliens convicted of certain criminal conduct. 16  The court then
ordered the INS to hold a bail hearing "to determine Kim's risk of
flight and dangerousness.' 17  Following this hearing, the INS
released Kim on bond.18
The INS appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order. 19 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not hold that §
1226(c) was unconstitutional on its face as applied to the broad
category of aliens who committed the listed violations, but instead
explained that Kim, as an LPR (a subset of the general class of aliens
addressed by the district court), was entitled to "the individualized
determination and fair procedures guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment., 2 0  The Ninth Circuit thereby
acknowledged, as did the lower court, that aliens are entitled to the
protection of the Due Process Clause. It further held that detaining
LPRs without a bail hearing pending deportation proceedings
violates the due process to which this class of aliens is entitled.
Unfortunately, although the Supreme Court agreed that aliens are
entitled to some due process, it did not agree with the scope of that
due process as defined by the Ninth Circuit.
III. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
The statute at issue in this case is Section 1226(c)(1) of the U.S.
Code, which states "[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody
14. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2000) (stating that "the Attorney General shall take
into custody any alien" who is removable because he has committed one of the
specified list of crimes).
15. Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 526.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 539.
20. Id.
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any alien who.., is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)... on
the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to
a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year. .. ,,21 The Supreme Court
stated that the statute applied to Kim because he qualified as an alien,
he conceded that he was deportable, and he "[did] not dispute
the validity of his prior convictions." 22 Kim challenged the
constitutionality of § 1226(c), not arguing that he was not subject to
§ 1226(c), but instead arguing that the statute itself violated due
process. Specifically, he alleged that his due process rights were
violated when the INS, pursuant to the statute, refused to grant him
an individualized bail hearing to determine whether or not he posed
a flight risk or a danger to society, but instead detained him without
considering these factors.2 3
As an overarching principle, the Court explained that "' [in the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens.' 24  The Court compared Kim's argument to similar
arguments in two other cases, Carlson v. Landon25 and Reno v.
Flores,26 acknowledging that the Court has repeatedly determined
27that Congress has substantial authority in immigration matters.
The Court, therefore, began its review of Kim's constitutional
challenge to § 1226(c) by looking at the background of the
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(C) (2000).
22. Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003).
23. Id. at 1713.
24. Id. at 1716 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
25. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
26. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
27. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1718-19. In Carlson, the detained aliens,
members of the Communist Party, challenged their detention on the grounds
that they were found not to be a flight risk. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 531-32. The
Carlson Court determined that since Congress had made such aliens deportable
based upon its findings regarding the Communist Party, the INS could deny
bail to the detainees "by reference to the legislative scheme" even without any
finding of flight risk. Id. at 543. In Reno, a class of alien juveniles brought a
due process challenge when the INS arrested them and detained them pending
their deportation hearings. 507 U.S. at 294. The Court determined "that
'reasonable presumptions and generic rules,' even when made by the INS
rather than Congress, are not necessarily impermissible exercises of Congress'
traditional power to legislate with respect to aliens." Demore, 123 S. Ct. at
1719 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 313).
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provision. 28 The Court recognized that "Congress adopted this
provision against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal
with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens., 29 Congressional
investigation additionally revealed that the INS had problems
identifying, locating, and removing deportable aliens from the United
States.3° Congress seemed to conclude that the increase in criminal
activity by aliens and the supposed difficulty in finding and
removing deportable aliens were linked. Against this backdrop,
Congress concluded that one of the major reasons for the INS's
problems in removing deportable criminals was the "agency's failure
to detain those aliens during their deportation proceedings.' In
support of this conclusion, Congress offered the statistic that more
than twenty percent of the deportable aliens who were released failed
to appear for their removal hearings.32 The Court credited these
findings and conclusions, relying heavily on them in its own
evaluation of the statute's constitutionality.
Nevertheless, even though Congress has broad discretion in
immigration matters, that discretion should not confer unlimited
power. Even the Supreme Court appears to agree that Congress's
plenary power is not limitless. For instance, in reviewing Congress's
rationale for passing the statute, the Court assessed whether or not
Congress went too far, implicitly acknowledging that, although
Congress has broad discretion, it must exercise that discretion within
the bounds of due process.
To determine whether Congress exceeded those bounds, the
Court balanced the interests of the government against the
individualized interests protected by the Due Process Clause. After
evaluating the interests at stake and in light of these interests, the
Court considered whether the government's actions were sufficiently
justified. It held that Congress was, in fact, justified in its concern
that if deportable criminal aliens are not detained, many would
continue to engage in criminal acts and fail to appear for their
removal hearings.33 Therefore, the Court concluded, detaining such
28. See Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1714.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1714-15.
31. Id. at 1715.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1714-15.
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aliens during their removal proceedings without conducting
individualized determinations of whether they presented flight risks
was not a violation of their due process rights.
34
The Court then went on to analyze the application of its recent
opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis,35 since Kim relied on the reasoning of
the Zadvydas opinion in his arguments for release. 36 In Zadvydas,
two aliens asserted, in separate writs of habeas corpus, that their
detentions under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 violated the Due Process Clause.
37
This statute permitted detention of aliens following a final order of
removal during the statutory removal period (ninety days), or beyond
that time if the alien for some reason was not removed as ordered
during that ninety day period.38 Here, the aliens were found to be
removable due to having engaged in criminal conduct, and thereafter
they were in fact ordered removed from the country. Pursuant to the
statute, the INS detained them pending their removal. The problem,
though, was that no country would accept them. As a practical
matter, the INS was faced with a choice of continuing to detain the
aliens, even though they had already served the full sentences for
their crimes, or releasing them in the United States. The INS
erroneously reasoned that it could detain them indefinitely under this
statute since, as no country would accept them, they would
indefinitely be "pending removal. 39
34. See id. at 1721-22.
35. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
36. See Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1719-21.
37. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-87 (2001) (consolidating two cases,
Zadvydas v. Davis and Ashcroft v. Ma, for argument).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(1)(C) (2000).
39. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-86. Zadvydas was born of Lithuanian
parents in Germany. Id. at 684. He had an extensive criminal record,
including "drug crimes, attempted robbery, attempted burglary, and theft." Id.
Zadvydas also had a "history of flight, from both criminal and deportation
proceedings." Id. He was ordered deported to Germany in 1994, but Germany
refused to accept him, claiming that he was not a German citizen. Id.
Lithuania also refused to accept Zadvydas, claiming that he was "neither a
Lithuanian citizen nor a permanent resident." Id. The INS also asked the
Dominican Republic to take Zadvydas because it was Zadvydas's wife's
country, but this was unsuccessful as well. Id. Ma was born in Cambodia, and
came to the United States as a child. Id. at 685. When he was seventeen, he
was involved in a gang-related shooting and was convicted of manslaughter.
Id. Ma was ordered for deportation because of his conviction for an
1720
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The Court concluded that, regardless of the statute's arguable
grant of power, the Constitution limits § 1231's post-removal-period
detention statute to a period "reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit
indefinite detention. ' 4°  The Court thereby found that indefinite
detention without adequate procedural protections violates due
process.41
The Court further recognized that, because deportation hearings
are civil rather than criminal in nature, there are not only inadequate,
but in fact no such procedural safeguards to protect these detainees.
Therefore, their indefinite detention necessarily results in a violation
of due process under this reasoning.42 The Court further inferred
that-even where detentions are not indefinite-the government
must have a reasonable purpose for the detention, and that the
detention period can only be as long as to reasonably fulfill that
purpose.
43
The Court was given the opportunity in Demore to extend its
holding in Zadvydas, thereby requiring that all alien detentions serve
a meaningful, rather than merely nominal or purported, immigration
purpose and further limiting the detention's duration to the time
period absolutely necessary to fulfill this purpose as in Zadvydas.
Under this reasoning, the Court in Demore would have had to declare
that the Constitution limits the Attorney General's authority to detain
Kim without a bail hearing. The Court, however, declined to extend
such a broad reading of Zadvydas to cover the facts of Demore.
44
Instead, the Court distinguished Zadvydas on two bases. First,
the Court focused on the status of the two aliens in Zadvydas, as
compared to Kim's status, finding their differing statuses legally
relevant as a threshold matter since they affected whether the
detentions served their purported immigration purpose as required
under its vision of due process. In Zadvydas, the Immigration Judge
had entered final orders of deportation against the aliens but their
aggravated felony. Id. However, the INS could not deport Ma because the
United States did not have a repatriation agreement with Cambodia. Id. at 686.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Id. at 690.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 690-96.
44. See Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (2003) ("Zadvydas is
materially different from the present case....").
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removal was "'no longer practically attainable"' since no country
would accept them.45 Therefore, their deportation proceedings were
concluded rather than pending. The Court maintained that, since the
proceedings were concluded, the detention in Zadvydas could not
and, in fact, "did not serve its purported immigration purpose.
' 46
On the other hand, the Court asserted that Kim's case differed
because the statute at issue dealt with deportable aliens "pending
their removal proceedings." Kim's removal proceedings were
pending. With proceedings still pending, the Court reasoned, the
detention serves the necessary (and ongoing) immigration purpose of
preventing such aliens from fleeing during the removal proceedings.
Thus, it was not controlled by the Zadvydas result, and therefore was
justifiable.47
The Court also distinguished Zadvydas from Kim's case on a
second ground by pointing out that the period of detention at issue in
Zadvydas was "'indefinite,"' while the detention under § 1226 is of a
"shorter duration. ' 48 The Court asserted that under § 1226(c), the
detention period has a "definite termination point," and it is often
shorter than the ninety-day period the Zadvydas Court held
presumptively valid.49 The Court concluded that, unlike indefinite
detentions, "[d]etention during removal proceedings is a
constitutionally permissible part of that process., 50 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that the finding in Zadvydas that indefinite detentions
violated due process did not control Kim's case or demand the same
result. As a result, Kim's constitutional challenge failed.51
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court
ignored the long history of the protection of aliens' constitutional
45. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1720.
48. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
49. Id. The Executive Office for Immigration Review calculated that in
eighty-five percent of the cases where aliens were detained under § 1226(c),
the removal proceedings took an average of forty-seven days. See id. at 1720-
21. However, Kim was detained for six months in INS custody. before the
District Court granted habeas relief. Id. In a footnote, the Supreme Court
explained that the longer-than-average term was due to the fact that Kim
himself requested a continuance. Id. at 1721 n. 15. Even without the
continuance, however, Kim would have been detained for five months.
50. Id. at 1721-22.
51. Id.
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rights and liberties. The Court also failed to fully analyze the
language of § 1226(c), and it misapplied the factors and rationale of
Zadvydas.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Historical Background: The Supreme Court's Well-Established
Precedent of Upholding the Constitutional Rights of Aliens
Aliens who legally reside in the United States, no matter what
their length of stay in this country, are entitled to constitutional
protection.52 In fact, the Court even stated that aliens in general are a
"prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom...
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 53 As recently as 2001,
the Court again affirmed that aliens have a right to protection under
the Due Process Clause in Zadvydas v. Davis.54 These rights at least
arguably include "the basic liberty from physical confinement lying
at the heart of due process."55 Additionally, the majority conceded
that "' [i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law in deportation proceedings. "' 56 Evidently, no
one disputes that aliens have a right to due process. This case instead
denies that an alien's loss of liberty in the face of pending
deportation proceedings is a violation of that due process.
Even if this were true with respect to the general class of aliens
(which this Comment argues it is not), compared to other aliens
within the United States, LPRs have an especially strong history of
constitutional protection. Therefore, their due process rights should
include freedom from confinement without an individualized
57determination that detention is necessary in their specific cases.
The rationale behind granting additional protection to LPRs is
grounded, in part, in the fact that "[t]he immigration laws give LPRs
52. Id.. at 1728 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that "[i]t has been settled for over a century that all aliens within our
territory are 'persons' entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.").
53. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citations omitted);
see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
54. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
55. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
56. Id. at 1717 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).
57. See id. at 1728 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the opportunity to establish a life permanently in this country by
developing economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from
those of a citizen., 58 For example, LPRs enjoy the same economic
freedom as United States citizens.59 Additionally, LPRs have many
of the same responsibilities as citizens: their worldwide income is
taxable,60 and male LPRs between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
six must register under the Selective Service Act of 1948.61 Thus,
the Court consistently infers that when aliens enter the United States,
they are subject to American rules, just as are ordinary citizens.
Correspondingly, it is only fair that the same rights and liberties
safeguard them as well.
No doubt based on these similarities to United States citizens,
the Supreme Court has in fact historically protected the rights of
LPRs.62 For instance, as long ago as 1892, the Court held that an
alien domiciled in the United States cannot be prohibited from
leaving the United States and then returning.63  Subsequently, in
1945, the Court in Bridges v. Wixon 64 concluded that "the notions of
fairness" that underlie our legal system apply in their entirety to
"aliens [who] may have become.., deeply fixed in this land., 65
Finally, in 1953, the Court held that the word "excludable" in a
statute did not apply to LPRs because such a reading would have
58. Id.
59. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing
that LPRs, like full citizens, "may compete for most jobs in the private and
public sectors without obtaining job-specific authorization").
60. Id. at 1728-29 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(construing 26 CFR §§ 1.1-1(b), 1.871-1(a), 1.871-2(b) (2002)).
Nonimmigrant aliens, on the other hand, are generally taxed only on income
from domestic sources. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)
61. Id. at 1729 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(construing Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, tit. I, § 3, 62 Stat. 604,
605).
62. See id. at 1729-30 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. See Lau Ou Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 63 (1892) (noting that a
domicile within the United States cannot be forfeited simply by a temporary
absence).
64. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
65. Id. at 154; see also id. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("[O]nce an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights
include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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been questionable given "a resident alien's constitutional right to due
,,66process. Consequently, the Court's refusal to consider Kim's
status as an LPR in its review of the case contradicts a long history of
acknowledging the rights of LPRs.
The above cases, among others, show a well-established
precedent and trend of the Supreme Court upholding the due process
rights of aliens, particularly LPRs.67 The about-face of the Supreme
Court in Demore gives rise to a troubling question: Does the Court's
decision to cut back on the rights of LPRs signal a new and
disturbing trend? If the Supreme Court is curtailing the rights of
aliens, it is important to determine the reasons underlying the Court's
actions.
B. The Court's Sacrifice of Constitutional Protections in the Wake of
September 11th
Although never mentioned in the Court's opinion, one reason for
the Court's shift could be a response to new national security policies
instigated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, in which nineteen foreign terrorists crashed commercial
airliners into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in
Washington D.C., and a Pennsylvania field, killing about three
thousand Americans. 68  Notably, Zadvydas, which extended due
66. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1953).
67. Although historically the Supreme Court has often upheld the
constitutional rights of aliens, it has not done so in every case. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of a
federal medical insurance program that required resident aliens to fulfill a five-
year continuous residency requirement when citizens did not have to meet the
same requirement); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (supporting
Congress's right to exclude aliens from entering the United States); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (stating that the deportation of resident
aliens because of their past membership in the Communist Party was not a
violation of due process).
68. While the events of September 11 th, 2001 are well-established and
known to the average American, in the context of this Comment, it seems
important to point out that the terrorists were aliens; the fact that the terrorist
network is comprised of foreigners, many of whom may be aliens within the
United States, is directly related to the resulting change in national security
policies. See, e.g., Bush State of the Union Address at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/index.html
(Jan. 29, 2002) (discussing the effect of the attacks of September 11 th, the
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process protections afforded aliens, was decided in June 2001, nearly
three months prior to the September 1 th attacks. Demore, on the
other hand, was decided after September 11 th and, unlike Zadvydas,
restricted the definition of due process as applied to aliens.
In the months following the attacks, the United States launched
its War on Terrorism and began reshaping national security policies
and "challenging the value that Americans have always placed on
civil liberties. 6 9 One such change in policy, passed in response to
the Bush Administration's "request for 'the tools' to fight
terrorism,' 70 is the USA Patriot Act.71 Certain provisions of the
Patriot Act deal with aliens, with a "seemingly intentional disregard
for the constitutional status of resident and temporary aliens. 72 For
example, under § 412 of the Patriot Act, if the Attorney General has
"'reasonable grounds to believe"' that an alien is engaged in
activities that threaten the national security of the United States, he is
authorized to take such alien into custody.73 It further provides, "If
an immigrant is detained for purposes related to immigration under
this provision, there is no statutory or constitutional authority to
control the length of the detention. 74  Since the passage of the
Patriot Act, this particular section has caused many aliens to be
detained indefinitely in United States detention facilities and prisons
"with no remedy. 75
Thus, even though the September 1 lth attacks were not
mentioned in Demore, and no one has alleged that Kim has any ties
to terrorism, its post-September 1 1th timing, combined with the
realities of the new political climate, suggest that the decision
reached by the majority signals a judicial mirroring of the post-
reactions of the American people and the government, and the actions taken by
the government in response to the terrorist attacks).
69. John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring
Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA
Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U.
L. REv. 1081, 1083 (2002).
70. Id. at 1087.
71. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
72. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 69, at 1095.
73. Id. at 1126 (quoting USA Patriot Act § 412).
74. Id. at 1127.
75. Id.
1726
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September 11 th political and legislative climate of willingness to
sacrifice personal liberties in exchange for a more certain national
security.
C. The Demore Court's Flawed Reasoning
1. The majority's failure to consider Kim's LPR status
Without explanation, the majority simply discounted Kim's
status as an LPR, choosing to avoid confronting the historical
protection afforded to this subset of aliens.77 Yet, until a final order
of removal is entered against him, Kim is entitled to all of the
benefits and rights of an LPR.78 By disregarding Kim's LPR status,
the majority ignored the Supreme Court's history of protecting the
constitutional rights of LPRs to a higher degree than those of other
immigrant classifications.
2. The majority's focus on congressional concern regarding
deportable criminal aliens
The majority focused on Congress's concern that, without
detention, deportable criminal aliens would "continue to engage in
crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large
numbers., 79 Although the cases make clear that some deference to
congressional findings when shaping immigration policy is
appropriate, the inordinate focus on these findings seemed to lull the
majority into failing to adequately address what should have been the
key concern: analyzing the extent of Kim's constitutional rights
under the Due Process Clause.
Another issue that the Court inadequately addressed was the
issue of an alien's rights if he or she is not found to. be deportable.
Early in the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Kim
conceded that he was deportable. Justice Souter, however, assertedthat the Court was mistaken-Kim never conceded that he was
76. See id. at 1084 (stating that since the September 1 Ith attacks, many
Americans are willing to give up some of their civil liberties in exchange for
greater security).
77. See Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1708-22 (2003).
78. Id. at 1728 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 1712.
80. Id.
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removable. 81 In fact, Souter stated that Kim had "applied to the
Immigration Court for withholding of removal" and that his counsel
confirmed that Kim "was challenging his removability." 82 Thus,
Kim never conceded that he is deportable, and if he is not deportable,
the majority's rationale can arguably be considered moot-he is not
a part of the class of "deportable" criminal aliens that concerns
Congress. If Kim is not within this class of aliens, then it follows-
under Zadvydas-that Kim has a right to a bail hearing because the
validation for detention without bail, namely that the alien is actually
pending deportation, is no longer necessarily present. Therefore, the
fit required between detention and the immigration purpose thereof
required by the Court's reasoning in Zadvydas could not possibly be
met.
83
3. The findings on which Congress, and therefore the Court, relied
were clearly faulty
The majority accepts the Congressional argument that detention
under 1226(c) "necessarily serves the purpose of preventing
deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their
removal proceedings ... ,84 As part of its rationale, the majority
mentioned congressional investigations conducted while the INS
operated under an older rule which allowed the Attorney General to
exercise discretion to release deportable aliens.85 These statistics
showed that the INS had a poor track record in successfully
deporting criminal aliens.86
Relying on these statistics, however, which were gleaned while
the INS was operating under the old rule, is misleading if applied to
the problem currently at hand. It seems clear that the reason behind
the INS's poor track record while operating under the old rule was
not that the agency could not make a good determination of flight
risk or dangerousness; rather, the INS could not detain more aliens
because of a lack of detention resources.8 7 At that time, the INS
81. Id. at 1727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
84. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1720.
85. Id. at 1714-15.
86. Id. at 1715.
87. Id.
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often decided not to detain aliens, even if they were significant flight
risks, because there were not enough spaces in the detention facilities
of the particular area.
88
Another factor the majority considered was the finding that
when deportable aliens were released, more than twenty percent did
not appear at their removal hearings.8 9 However, as Justice Souter
accurately pointed out, this finding, too, is faulty in that it failed to
distinguish between the different immigrant statuses of the criminal
aliens.9 0 The statistic includes all criminal aliens-LPRs such as
Kim, who have "strong ties within the United States," as well as
temporary visitors and illegal aliens.91 Misplaced reliance on such a
statistic which, due to essentially lumping together apples and
oranges, exaggerates the likelihood that LPRs will fail to report,
resulting in LPRs losing their rights based upon the actions taken by
illegal aliens and others who are not constitutionally protected to the
same degree as LPRs.
Additionally, Justice Souter pointed to a study conducted by the
Vera Institute of Justice that "conclu[ded] that criminal aliens
released under supervisory conditions are overwhelmingly likely to
attend their hearings., 92 The majority disregards this second study
despite the implication that a supervisory system may equally
achieve Congress's goal of ensuring that deportable aliens attend
their removal hearings. A supervisory system may, in fact, achieve
the congressional objective in a manner that is more constitutional
than § 1226(c). The constitutional problem of § 1226(c)-as
discussed in this Comment-is that aliens are detained without an
inquiry into whether they are either dangerous or a flight risk,
thereby triggering a due process issue. However, with a supervisory
system like the one tested by the Vera Institute, aliens would be
evaluated based on several factors, including whether they posed a
danger to society and whether they have strong ties to families and
their communities. 93 Therefore, under such a plan, only the criminal
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1715 n.4.
90. Id. at 1739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 1740 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See id. at 1716 n.5; id. at 1740 n.15.
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aliens who are deemed to be either dangerous to society or flight
risks would be detained.
In addition to being more constitutional, the supervisory plan
may be more effective in making sure criminal aliens appear for their
deportation hearings. Section 1226(c) does not provide the solution
to the problem of lack of detention space. For example, the INS may
wish to detain a criminal alien under § 1226(c) but find that there is
no space at the detention facility. The Vera Institute, however, found
that its system "significantly reduced no-shows while decreasing the
use of detention space." 94  Because the supervisory system will
detain only those aliens that are dangerous or flight risks, there is a
higher likelihood that the INS will have the detention facilities to
accommodate them. This will, in turn, lead to a higher success rate
for the INS in ensuring that criminal aliens appear for their
deportation hearings. The fact that the majority disregarded this
study, which provided a plan that can potentially fulfill the
congressional objective effectively and in a manner that will not
implicate the due process rights of aliens, is very disturbing.
4. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court failed to thoroughly
analyze the language of § 1226(c)
In its opinion, the Supreme Court never thoroughly analyzes the
language of § 1226(c). The relevant portion of the statute states:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who-
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B),
(C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title
on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been
sentence [sic] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year,
or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title
or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
94. David A. Martin, Too Many Behind Bars, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003,
at 51, 53.
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when the alien is released, without regard to whether the
alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation,
and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or
imprisoned again for the same offense.
95
Instead of analyzing the language of this statute, the Supreme
Court merely defers to Congress. In contrast, when the Ninth Circuit
reviewed Kim's case, it carefully examined the language of §
1226(c).96 After doing so, the court noted that bail is not allowed
while the removal proceedings are pending, even if the aliens are
neither flight risks nor a danger to society.97 Second, the court
realized that a "wide range of past conduct triggers removal
proceedings and detention without bail" and that a lot of that conduct
is "non-violent and poses little threat to the physical safety of the
public." 98 Finally, the court contrasted the no-bail provision of §
1226(c), whose constitutionality was questionable, with the provision
that allows bail under § 1231(a)(6), which was questioned by the
Zadvydas case.99 Under § 1231 (a)(6), aliens who have actual orders
of final removal entered against them can obtain bail ninety days
after entry of the order.
100
The Ninth Circuit decided to "take guidance" from the Zadvydas
case's analysis of § 1231(a)(6) and apply the same reasoning to the
question of the constitutionality of § 1226(c).10 1 The court stated that
"Zadvydas reaffirmed the principle that aliens are entitled to
protection under the Due Process Clause."'1 2 The Ninth Circuit did
not deny that Congress has plenary powers over immigration
matters. 103 However, the court explained that this power is subject to
limits placed by the Constitution, and that the limits were implicated
in Kim's case. 1°4 In order for the government to exercise this
plenary power within constitutional limits over aliens, and to detain
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2000).
96. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 527 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
101. Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 529.
102. Id. at 530.
103. Id. at 529.
104. Id.
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an LPR, the court reasoned that it must provide a "sufficiently
strong" justification for its act.
10 5
Therefore, the appellate court considered the government's
justifications for the no-bail civil detention under § 1226(c). 10 6 It
dismissed three of the five justifications and focused on the two
primary arguments: the risk of flight of the criminal aliens during
removal proceedings and the need to protect the public from aliens
who may be dangerous. 10 7 After careful review, the court concluded
that these remaining justifications were also insufficient-the fact
that some aliens may pose a flight risk or be dangerous to the public
was not enough to justify the overbroad "civil detention, without
bail, of all lawful permanent resident aliens who have been charged
with removability."
10 8
The Ninth Circuit, in applying Zadvydas, carefully analyzed the
language of § 1226(c) to determine whether the statute was a
permissible act of Congress. 10 9 However, the Supreme Court, faced
with the same issue, simply concluded that Zadvydas does not apply
in Kim's case and justified upholding § 1226(c) on the basis of
deference to Congress."1
0
5. The Supreme Court's decision not to follow Zadvydas in this case
The Supreme Court's reasons for declining to apply Zadvydas to
this case are not persuasive. The fact pattern, of course, is different.
The most obvious difference, as the Court points out, is that
Zadvydas dealt with aliens who had final orders of deportation
against them, but had no country to where they might go, while
Kim's removal proceedings were still pending."' However,
Zadvydas and Ma, the two aliens in the Zadvydas case, were found to
105. Id. at 530.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 531. The other three justifications were "making the removal of
criminal aliens a top priority of immigration enforcement,... correcting the
failure of the prior laws which permitted release on bond, and ... repairing
damage to America's immigration system." Id. at 530. The Ninth Circuit
dismissed these three arguments as being too general. Id. at 531.
108. Id. at 534.
109. See id. at 526-34.
110. See Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1719-22 (2003).
111. Id. at 1720-21.
1732
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF LPRs
be a flight risk1 12 and potentially dangerous to the public,
respectively. 113 In contrast, when the District Court ordered the INS
to hold an individualized bail hearing to establish whether Kim was a
flight risk or a danger to society, the INS released Kim on a modest
bond.114 Since his release, Kim has kept a clean record, working and
attending college while his deportation hearing is pending.
11 5
Allowing bail for removable aliens such as Zadvydas and Ma
just because no country was willing to receive them, while detaining
Kim, who actually has the right to fight his removal proceedings,
without bail seems counterintuitive. As Justice Souter pointed out,
Kim's claim was stronger than any argument discussed in Zadvydas:
"detention prior to entry of a removal order may well impede the
alien's ability to develop and present his case on the very issue of
removability." ' 1 6 Moreover, as an LPR, Kim has a chance to win
against his deportation order. Justice Souter explained that "[u]nlike
many illegal entrants and temporary nonimmigrants, LPRs are the
aliens most likely to press substantial challenges to removability
requiring lengthy proceedings. ' 17 Yet, the majority concluded that
Kim's deportation was inevitable and decided that taking away his
liberty without bail in the interim was, therefore, not a violation of
his due process rights.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's holding in Demore encourages a
dangerous new movement toward taking away important rights and
liberties of immigrants. The Supreme Court declared that aliens,
even LPRs like Kim, could be detained without bail hearings during
their deportation proceedings." 18 The holding seems simple enough,
but there is a possibility that this holding may be extended. The
112. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001).
113. Id. at 685-86.
114. See Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 526.
115. Martin, supra note 94, at 53.
116. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1734 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Citizens and Immigrants for Equal
Justice et al. at 24, Demore (No.01-1491).
117. Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1741 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
118. Id. at 1721-22.
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Supreme Court may have embarked on a slippery slope on which the
rights of aliens will be further compromised.
It is unclear whether the Demore holding will be extended into
non-immigration areas, or whether it could implicate the rights of
aliens in a criminal trial. In general, defendants in criminal
proceedings, after being "taken into custody and formally charged
with a crime," attend a bail hearing where a magistrate or a trial
judge decides whether they can be released from custody while they
wait for their trials.1 19 Bail hearings are conducted to determine a
defendant's flight risk and potential danger to society.'
20
In Demore, the Supreme Court appears to believe that criminal
defendants who are also aliens are very likely to be a flight risk, as
shown in its reliance on the statistics of criminal aliens failing to
appear at their deportation hearings. It is not much of a leap, then,
for a state to conclude that aliens as a class are a flight risk.
For example, the State of California, following the decision in
Demore, might, decide that when criminal defendants are found to
also be aliens, they are automatically to be denied bail hearings and
held in custody until trial. After all, if a concern exists that a
criminal alien will not appear at a deportation hearing, it seems
logical to also be concerned that the same criminal alien will fail to
appear for his trial. In deference to the type of congressional
findings cited in Demore, the Supreme Court might conclude that
denial of bail hearings in criminal proceedings against defendants
who are also aliens is not a violation of the Due Process Clause.
One can argue that the above scenario is implausible for several
reasons. The first reason is that the states do not have the plenary
power of Congress. It is well established that when states make
"classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, [the classifications] are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny.' 121 Therefore, such a law in California, as in the
above example, would be subject to a higher standard of judicial
review than the one received by § 1226(c), and the courts would
probably strike it down. However, if the criminal alien was charged
with a federal crime, a different result may very well occur. The
119. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
983 (2001).
120. Id.
121. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,372 (1971).
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rationale in Demore could be used by Congress to support a federal
statute denying bail to aliens charged with a federal crime.
Another reason that this scenario may be implausible, as of right
now, is that criminal defendants are entitled to greater procedural
protections under the Constitution than they would have in a civil or
administrative proceeding. 122 At this time, those procedural
protections apply to anyone who comes into criminal courts,
including aliens. Thus, the hypothetical given above is an extreme
case and, arguably, it is a scenario that is highly unlikely. Then
again, in the past, the United States government has taken extreme
action that seemed highly unlikely, such as the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War 11.123
The concern that the Demore holding is the start of a further
erosion of rights and liberties of aliens is not groundless. This case
was decided against the backdrop of the September 11 th attacks and
the fear of future terrorist attacks. Although September 11 th was not
mentioned in Demore, it is highly likely that the attacks were in the
back of the minds (or even in the front of the minds) of the justices
holding the majority opinion. In fact, even before this case was
accepted by the Supreme Court for review, some people wondered if
the post-September 1 lth climate would influence the Court. 124 The
Demore decision shows that this concern may have been justified.
In Demore, the unmentioned fear is that aliens like Kim will turn
out to be terrorists who escape the deportation proceeding to wreak
further havoc against the American people. Perhaps this is not such
an unreasonable fear. While the holding in this case may, on the
surface, seem to empower the INS to promote national security, in
light of the fact that the INS itself is often responsible for releasing
aliens who are considered flight risks when there is a lack of space in
the detention facilities, 125 the holding may instead only act to open
the door toward the further loss of liberties of aliens in the United
States.
In the wake of the September lth attacks and the anti-
immigration feeling that they triggered, aliens in the United States
122. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 119, at 71-74.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 129-33.
124. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 94, at 51.
125. Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1739 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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need the protection of the courts more than ever before.
"Historically, judicial review has served as an invaluable safeguard
against arbitrary decision-making by federal administrative agencies,
including the INS.' 26 In the current "post-9/11 environment of zero
tolerance," judicial review is crucial to "prevent and correct abuses
of discretion by immigration officials."'127 In fact, the only remedy
aliens have is judicial review. After all, aliens in the United States
do not have voting rights, barring them access to the protection a
citizen can get through the democratic process. 28 Thus, without the
protection of the courts, aliens have no other recourse when faced
with the threat of losing their rights and liberties.
Admittedly, national security is an important and necessary
concern. Perhaps infringements on constitutional rights are
necessary for the safety of the American people. It is necessary to
bear in mind, however, that "even small infringements, over time,
may become major compromises that alter this country's way of
life."'129 The government must be careful when it develops
immigration laws in particular. "[T]here is a problem in developing
immigration policies on the basis of fear. History has shown that we,
Americans, get into trouble when we legislate out of fear."'130 One
such historical example of the United States "legislating out of fear"
is the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War 11.131
This disturbing moment in American history surfaced when wartime
fear caused the government to take away the liberty and rights of
numerous Japanese-Americans. Since then, the United States has
acknowledged the injustice of this action and has awarded
reparations to those affected. 132 The Japanese-American internment
is just one example of how fear can cause due process to be
126. David B. Pakula & Lawrence P. Lataif, Judicial Review of BCIS
Decisions: Will There Be Any?, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 677, 677 (2003).
127. Id.
128. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (Henry, J.,
dissenting).
129. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 69, at 1084.
130. John S. Richbourg, Liberty and Security: The Yin and Yang of
Immigration Law, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 475, 478 (2003).
131. Seeid. at483.
132. See id.
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sacrificed in the name of national security. 133 The compromise of the
rights and liberties of different groups is collateral damage in our
efforts to heighten national security.
One can hopefully trust that the injustice that occurred during
the Japanese-American internment will never happen again in this
country. However, there may be signs of such an impending threat
to the civil liberties of aliens within the United States. For example,
after September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration instituted a
special registration of aliens who legally enter the United States from
twenty-five specified countries. 134 All of these countries, with the
exception of North Korea, are Arab or Muslim. 135 This special
registration is eerily familiar-it is reminiscent of the order given to
Japanese-Americans to "report to assembly centers during World
War I1.,,136 One can only hope that the decision in Demore, along
with other actions taken in the name of security, is not the start of a
slippery slope in which aliens will lose other fundamental rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. Kim is a departure
from the Court's long established precedent of upholding the
constitutional rights of aliens. By quickly deferring to Congress
instead of scrutinizing the statute and following the tradition of
upholding the constitutional rights of aliens, the Supreme Court
established ominous precedent for dealing with the rights of aliens.
Although Congress does have plenary power over immigration
matters, this power is not an unlimited one. It must be held in check
by the Constitution. As Judge William Fletcher, who wrote the
opinion in Kim v. Ziglar, stated, "[wie must remember that our
'Nation's armor' includes our Constitution, the central text of our
civic faith. It is the foundation of everything that makes our
country's system of laws and freedoms worth defending."'
' 37
Accordingly, the right to due process is a fundamental individual
right that should not be easily obstructed by the government. With
133. See id. at 483-84.
134. Id. at 503.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 538-39 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Demore, however, the Supreme Court illustrates that this right can,
in fact, be taken away-even when the justifications for its
infringement are questionable.
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